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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to gather information regarding 
children's developing sense of self. Seventy children, ages three to 
seven years, were tested on three measures. In the first task, the 
children tried on a mask and answered questions about their identity 
while looking in a mirror. The second involved a group of conservation 
tasks where external objects, the child's body, or part thereof, were 
the objects in question. The third was a picture task where pictures of 
a person, a person wearing a mask, and an animal were compared and the 
children were asked to decide which two of the pictures were most alike. 
The results indicated that the three measures were not correlated with 
one another. The mask task seemed to separate the three and four year 
olds from the older children. The conservation tasks involving the 
child's entire body separated the 3, 4, and 5 year old children from the 
6 and 7 year olds. The picture task also separated the 3, 4, and 5 year 
olds from the older children, and the more standard conservation tasks 
separated the seven year olds from the younger children. The results 
are discussed in terms of a theory of development of self identity.
Based on a Piagetian framework, a hypothesis for a more global view of 
children's play is also presented.
viii
CHAPTER I
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
There has been a great deal of anecdotal evidence to indicate 
that children "believe" in their make-believe enough to do very out-of- 
the-ordinary things. Every so often there is a newspaper account of a 
child falling from a window or building while trying to fly after read­
ing or seeing Peter Pan or while pretending to be superman or spiderman.
A further correlate of this phenomenon, as Brim (1976) mentions, is "the 
treasured stories and legends about metamorphosis in children, for 
example, Alice in Wonderland, Peter Pan and Snow White, which are espe­
cially poignant because they engage children's fascination with possible 
transformation of self" (p. 250). To what degree children "believe" in 
their ability to change into something or someone different than them­
selves, and whether there is a developmental sequence involved in this 
process formed the questions which were the instigation of this study.
The broader purpose of this investigation involves children's understand­
ing of themselves as separate psychological and physical entities whose 
basic properties can not magically change. It would seem to make sense 
that this kind of understanding of self would be influenced by the
child's level of cognitive development and the way in which he under-
.stands the world.
The kind of understanding of oneself that is referred to here is 
one's sense of self as a single entity and as a causal agent. The
1
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distinction made here is the same as the one made by Wylie (1961) in an 
extensive review of the Self-Concept literature. According to English 
and English (1958), the word "self" has two predominant meanings in psy­
chology: (a) the self as subject or agent, and (b) the self as the
individual that is known to oneself. The second definition is generally 
what is referred to as one's "self concept." The first meaning is the 
one that is intended here. The "sense of self" that is referred to is 
less involved with introspection than is self concept. It is more 
involved with the physical properties of the individual as well as the 
continuance over time of oneself as an entity.
After a review of the literature done on Self-Concept in the 
last 10 years, it was found that the research was heavily directed 
toward the constructs of ideal-self, perceived social self (how you 
think others perceive you), and measures of self-esteem and the vari­
ables which may effect one's self-esteem. Generally, the idea of Self- 
Concept was portrayed as how "good" or how "bad" you evaluate yourself. 
These kinds of studies do not address the issue of how one comes to know 
oneself as an entity, but begin by assuming that one does know oneself, 
and ask questions about how "good" oneself or others evaluate that self.
The idea of self as subject or agent seems to have been largely 
ignored. How one comes to know that one is a "self," and the extent of 
that "self," is a question that very few researchers have asked. The 
kind of question that is being asked here seems to be more basic than 
the questions addressed by most researchers in the area of Self-Concept. 
Whether knowing oneself as a "self" is a precursor to being able to 
evaluate oneself is not yet known. Perhaps research into the
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development of one's sense of self might be related to research involv­
ing the locus of self esteem. If young children tend to evaluate them­
selves as others do, while older children have progressively internal­
ized evaluations of themselves, then perhaps this may be indicative of a 
more well defined sense of self as the child grows older.
Witkin, Dyk, Faterson, Goodenough and Karp (1962) found that 
children's drawings of a person rated on a five point scale signifi­
cantly correlated with how they performed on orientation tasks in the 
laboratory. Based on a number of measures, children who were classified 
as field-dependent generally produced unarticulated drawings, while 
children classified as field-independent generally produced a highly 
detailed drawing of a person. The authors imply that there is a con- 
nection between how differentiated one's sense of self is (drawing of a 
person) and how dependent upon the external environment is one's orien­
tation. If children generally become more field independent as they 
grow older, then perhaps this is indicative of a more well defined sense 
of self. However, much more research is needed if the concept of sense 
of self is to be linked with the rest of the vast Self-Concept research.
This study investigated children's belief in their ability to be 
transformed into something or someone else. It also measured the child's 
level of cognitive development and whether the child's level of cogni­
tive development was related to the extent to which he perceives of him­
self as transformable. If belief in the transformation of self and the 
child's level of cognitive development were related, then children's 
understanding of themselves may be linked to their cognitive development 
in terms of the world. Further, children's make-believe in general
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may be understood as reflective of children's growing cognitive abili­
ties and their growing understanding of the world.
Much of Piaget's work and theory is directed to the child's 
understanding of the world about him. The focus here involves the 
child's understanding of himself, both as a part of the world and as 
separate from it. Naturally, these two overlap, since much of the 
child's understanding of himself results from his interaction with the 
world. It may be generally stated that children interact with their 
world by either imitating, learning (both experiencing and understand­
ing), or playing in their environment (Singer, 1973).
Theories of Make-Believe Play
There have been many reviews of children's play (Berlyne, 1969; 
Gilmore, 1966; Herron & Sutton-Smith, 1971; Klinger, 1971; Millar, 1968; 
Singer, 1973; Smilansky, 1968). Briefly, the current theories of make- 
believe or fantasy play fall into three categories: emotionally acti­
vated fantasy, preparatory or practice play for later life activities, 
and symbolic play as an extension of the child's general level of cogni­
tive functioning. That there are three divergent theories of why chil­
dren play has been a theoretical problem in the area of play for a long 
time. It may be that these divergent explanations of the origin of play 
occur because the authors view only some of children's play as meaning­
ful and the rest as simply entertainment or "wasted time" (Singer, 1973).
The theory that children's play is an imitation of or practice/ 
play for future life demands and events originated with Groos (1901).
This theoretical viewpoint generally depicts play in terms of the
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child's future, not his current situation. In this explanation, play is 
directly functional in terms of preparing for a job, getting married, 
raising children, etc. Children's play is a constant preparation to 
become an adult, in a very concrete sense. Certainly, some of chil­
dren's play is imitation or practice play for upcoming events, but there 
also seems to be a large body of play activities which cannot be cate­
gorized along these lines. Pretending to be an animal or superman is 
not preparing the child for a possible future role. It is clear that 
children imitate adults. It is much less clear that this imitation is 
future directed and has implications for the child's career choice, etc.
Another theory of children's play is derived from psychoanalytic 
theory (Freud, 1958) and basically states that play is an extension of 
children's affective lives and that children use play to work out con­
flicts or problem situations (Millar, 1968). Again, it seems hard to 
deny that some of children's play is directed by their affective lives, 
but it does not appear reasonable to assume that the enormous variety of 
play activities that children engage in are all related to children's 
"real life" interactions with their parents or peers. Both of these 
theories of play focus on some aspects of play while ignoring others. 
Both are also based primarily on the content of play rather than the 
process or act of make-believe itself, regardless of content.
The third theory, generally attributable to Piaget (1962), 
focuses on make-believe (he refers to it as symbolic play) as a natural 
extension of the child's current level of cognitive functioning in the 
world. Piaget explains the advent of symbolic play by invoking the 
basic processes of thought, assimilation and accommodation.
i
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Assimilation refers to the child's taking in information and fitting it 
into his already constructed schemes or action hypotheses. Accommoda­
tion is the development of new schemes or a modification of existing 
schemes in order to understand or categorize information that does not 
lend itself to direct assimilation. Assimilation involves fitting the 
world into the child's already established schemes. Accommodation 
involves changing the scheme to more closely fit the external world. 
Adaptive thought, bringing about the growth of intelligence, involves 
both of these processes. The closer their functioning is to being in 
equilibrium (i.e., with respect to the ratio of assimilation and accom­
modation), the more adaptive is the thought process. Intelligence, then, 
involves an equilibrium between the two processes, assimilation and 
accommodation. The closer these two are to being in equilibrium, the 
closer the child's understanding of the world will correspond to 
"objective" reality. Play, in this theory, is the occurrence of the 
primacy of assimilation over accommodation. In play, the child does 
not change his schemes to understand the world, he alters the world (via 
symbolic or make-believe play) to fit his already existing schemes. He 
assimilates the world to his viewpoint. If the world does not readily 
fit into his limited understanding, rather than change his understanding 
through accommodation, the child alters the environment through make- 
believe to fit his present conceptions. For Piaget, play is not a 
unique activity of the child, but fits readily into his theory of cogni­
tive development as a corollary of the process of intellectual develop­
ment. Singer (1973) supports Piaget's position, pointing out that it 
makes much more sense to view make-believe play as part of an overall
assimilation within a limited range of cognitive schemes than to postu­
late play as a defensive or conflict reducing behavior. Millar (1968), 
too, seems to agree with Piaget's position that make-believe play is 
really a process of thinking in action with real objects as props. It 
seems that make-believe play may be understood by examining children's 
cognitive development. Make-believe involving the transmutability of 
the self may also fit into this theory of cognitive development.
Piaget's theory is currently the most clearly articulated and integra­
tive of children's cognitive development.
Piaget's Theory of Make-Believe Play
Piaget's theory of symbolic play is most clearly illustrated in 
his book Play, Dreams, and Imitation in Childhood (1962). In this work, 
Piaget lists the usual criteria of play (an end in itself, spontaneous, 
pleasurable, lacking organization) and explains how they are all met by 
referring to play as simply a predominance of assimilation. All thought 
involves assimilation. Symbolic play is distinctive in that it subordi­
nates accommodation instead of being in equilibrium with it. Symbolic 
play is related to adapted thought but it differs in degree of accommo­
dation, forming one pole of the thought process. Imitation is separate 
from this since it does not involve symbolism, but repetition. For 
Piaget, symbolic play is mental assimilation while imitation is sensori­
motor assimilation. Imitation is action oriented, with the child repro­
ducing what has struck him, pleased him, or which he feels makes him 
more a part of his environment. Symbolic play differs since the symbols 
can move play in new directions, further and further removed from simple
7
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practice. Symbolic play is representational: objects "stand for" other
iobjects and the activities quickly expand beyond imitation into entirely 
new interactions.
After the age of two years, the symbolic function becomes more 
and more available to the child. The child leaves the stage of sensori­
motor intelligence and enters into the realm of preconceptual represen­
tation where the symbols make up the very structure of the child's 
thought. The symbols allow expansion beyond imitation, but are ego­
centric in nature, and since they are unique to the child, not yet con­
ventional in the sense of shared social signs. The image or signifier 
that is available to the child remains only within the scope of indi­
vidual thought, while the sign is always social. This is what Piaget 
refers to when he speaks of the child's thought as being egocentric and 
why some of children's make-believe is incomprehensible to the adult.
The child's individualistic symbols may have no meaning to an adult
.
observer, or they may mean something very different to the child than 
they mean to the adult.
Freud hypothesized that symbolism arose because the content of 
the symbols was repressed. Groos (1901) hypothesized that symbolism 
arose because there is so much in the world that the child cannot yet 
understand. Both of these explanations are missing the point according 
to Piaget, since the formation of the symbol is not due to its content 
but to the very structure of the child's thought. In play, the object 
that the child uses as a symbol of something else becomes more than just 
a representation of that something else, it becomes its substitute, as 
if it actually were the symbolized other. In cognitive representation
9
(where there is an equilibrium between assimilation and accommodation) 
there is adaptation to the signified (i.e., what the object "stands 
for"), and the corresponding symbol-object is only one representative of 
a general class. In play, the symbol-object has a meaning and existence 
in and of itself. In cognitive representation the symbol remains sym­
bolic, it "stands for" something else. For the child, the play symbol 
becomes a substitute, it "is" the other, not merely a representation.
From Piaget's (1962) point of view,symbolic play is not a unique 
case different from the child's other means of cognitive functioning.
It simply is one form of thought, derived from the child's current level 
of cognitive structure. Symbolic play is distinguished from adapted 
thought in that it is not directed toward an understanding of a collec­
tive or "objective" truth, but to an individual truth whose aim is sat­
isfaction of the ego. In this sense, because the child's thought is not 
directed toward a collective understanding, but to satisfaction of only 
the self, there is no reason to suppose that the child does not believe 
in his own way whatever he chooses to be real. The child seems to enjoy 
a private reality all his own that is believed in spontaneously, without 
reflection. As Piaget (1962) says, "the two to four year old child does 
not consider whether his [make-believe] symbols are real or not. For 
him it is a question that does not arise, because symbolic play is 
direct satisfaction of the ego and has its own kind of belief, which is 
subjective reality" (p. 168). This subjective reality gives rise to 
what Piaget refers to as a preconcept, where there is assimilation to a 
specific object without any generalization to all such objects. Later, 
from the age of four or five to about six or eight, preconcepts become
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more generalized and tend toward operational concepts; generality is 
gradually achieved, and operations become reversible. During this time, 
the child's thought becomes less egocentric, resulting in a more gen­
eralized assimilation and an extension of accommodation.
Briefly, the sequence is as follows: (a) in the sensori-motor 
stage, assimilation and accommodation are always in the present without 
symbolic thought; (b) in the preconceptual stage, symbolic thought 
arises, allowing earlier assimilations and accommodations to be recalled 
and interfere with those of the present. Yet, the objects of thought 
are still only one particular object to another particular object and do 
not represent generalized classes as such; (c) in operational thought 
accommodation and assimilation are in equilibrium and classes or gen­
eralized schemas are compared one with another rather than just parti­
cular instances of each.
Cognitive Development as it Relates 
to the Sense of Self
During the stage of cognitive development which Piaget refers to 
as the sensori-motor period, the child's understanding of the world goes 
through a process of decentration. Simply stated, the child discovers 
that everything does not stem from himself and that objects have an 
existence which is independent of himself. The child gradually views 
the world in a less egocentric way and slowly realizes that there are 
other points of view besides his own. Obviously this process does not 
stop at the end of this period, but for the most part, Piaget directs 
himself to the child's understanding of the external world and only
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briefly to the reciprocal process, whereby, if the world becomes separate 
from the child, then the child must become separate from the world.
For Piaget (1972), the young child does not really conceive of 
himself as a psychological entity whose thoughts, feelings, and motiva­
tions are separate from other people, or even from the physical world.
An example is Piaget's (1962) reporting of his daughter (J) around age 
two. She "separated herself according to the images she saw of herself, 
into J. in the glass, J. doing that, and J. in the photo. [For her], 
the same individual [herself] can be comprised of several distinct per­
sons, each person differing according to the clothes worn or the images 
presented in a mirror or a photograph" (p. 226). The young child does 
not view himself as having a consistent identity through time. The 
child cannot put the pieces together to form a composite whole. In cog­
nitive terms, the child does not yet understand the concept of the indi­
vidual elements comprising a general class, in this case, the class of 
self. The self is a class made up of all of the individual instances of 
a single person. The person wearing different clothes from day to day, 
standing up or sitting down, when they were an infant or when they were 
five, are all subsets of the class "self."
Piaget (1954) believes that the development of the concept of 
self follows from the child's discovery and understanding of a permanent 
universe. After attaining object permanence, the child no longer views 
himself as the cause of all external events, but his perception of him­
self as a causal agent separate from other things, represents a growing 
sense of self, both as opposed to other things and in a cause and effect 
relationship with them.
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Piaget (1962) talks of this stage of development and the child's 
view of himself as one of "participation," where the child can directly 
identify one element with another, without understanding that the sum of 
the elements constitute a whole. The child recognizes objects as simi­
lar and can compare them on a one-to-one basis, but the concept of the 
sum of them forming a generalized class is still beyond him. The 
child's understanding of himself is not essentially different from the 
child's understanding of other objects, and the child's make-believe too 
follows the same pattern. The preconcept and the child's make-believe 
symbols are both based on a predominance of assimilation, without the 
accommodation that the objects form a general class.
Since Piaget's explanation seems to describe and account for the 
child's understanding of objects, his understanding of himself, and his 
propensity for make-believe, Piaget s theoretical stance gains stature.
If the child's thought is operating at a certain level of development
■ •
where assimilation predominates, then this same level of cognitive 
development should explain the child's symbolic play and conception of 
self. If, as Piaget asserts, the child's level of cognitive development 
precludes adult operations in dealing with the world, then it should also 
hold true for all of the child's mental operations, including the child's 
understanding of himself.
,
Much research has been done and much has been written about 
Piaget's theory with respect to cognitive development in terns of the 
child's interaction with and understanding of the world. There has been 
much less research in the area of the child's developing understanding
of himself.
Experimental Evidence for a 
Developing Sense of Self
Theories of children's development of a concept of self as 
related to their developing cognitive abilities are generally lacking 
experimental evidence to support them. One study by Bell (1970), 
relates Piaget's theory to the development of other person permanence 
(not the self) as opposed to object permanence during the sensori-motor 
period. Bell found that the majority of children developed person- 
permanence with respect to their mother before they understood the con­
cept of object permanence. The development of person-permanence did not 
always precede the development of object permanence however, and it was 
confounded with the quality of the attachment between mother and child. 
Though this study did not deal directly with the child's understanding 
of himself, it seems to imply that concepts about other people may 
appear before the analogous concepts involving inanimate objects. It 
must be noted though that other people and inanimate objects are both 
external objects and if the dimension of internal vs. external is more 
important than the dimension of people vs. inanimate objects, then 
Bell's study may not have implications for the development of an under­
standing of self.
Feffer and Gourevitch (1960) touched on the concept of self in 
their research investigating role-taking in children. They found that 
their role-taking task which involved taking the point of view of 
another, was positively correlated with both age and several Piagetian 
tasks. Even when the scores were controlled for age, the role-taking 
task was significantly related to the Piagetian tasks. Though their
13
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work did not directly involve the children's sense of self, in order to 
think of ones self as an entity, one must be able to look at oneself as 
if from outside, as if one were another looking at oneself. The process 
of decentration thus may have implications for understanding oneself as 
well as the external world.
Murray (1969) did attempt to directly measure children's under­
standing of themselves in terms of conservation of their own bodies.
His first and second grade subjects seemed to be acquiring conservation 
of mass, weight, and volume of a clay ball before they conserved these 
same qualities regarding their own bodies. Murray's data appear to con­
tradict what one might expect from Bell's (1970) research, where babies 
gained person-permanence before object permanence, but as was said 
before, the more salient dimension may be internal/external rather than 
person/object.
A study by Guardo (1968) attempted to map a developmental 
sequence for the attainment of the concept of self. Her cross-sectional 
study of kindergarten through third grade children indicated that chil­
dren tend to conceive of themselves first in terms of sexuality, fol­
lowed by a sense of humanness, and then individuality. The children's 
sense of self as continuous over time was much less certain than the 
other three concepts and was postulated to be a later developing concept. 
This last result is interesting since it relates very well to what 
Piaget (1962) mentioned about his daughter when she did not understand 
that the individual instances comprise a composite whole.
Generally, the studies mentioned thus far have only skirted the 
question of the child's developing sense of self as it relates to the
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child's cognitive development. Another area of research that also 
touches on the understanding of the child's sense of self is the work 
being done in the area of fantasy play and its relationship with cogni­
tive development.
Gould (1972), in a large observational study of children's fan­
tasy play in a naturalistic setting>found some developmental trends that 
lead to speculation about cognitive correlates. It was found that as a 
group, the three year olds "swung" more freely from reality to fantasy 
than did the four and five year olds. Gould's concept of "fluctuating 
certainty" also seems to reflect the distinctions between the age groups. 
Fluctuating certainty is defined as "the child's more or less frequent 
and transient inability to distinguish firmly between a pretend and a 
real danger" (p. 6). Many of the young children in Gould's study acted 
as if the pretend episode in which they were engaged confronted them 
with real danger. Many of their fear reactions to the pretend situation 
were not part of the fantasy and usually ended the "game." With the 
younger children in the sample, there was a good deal of fluctuating 
certainty, but beyond the age of three and one half to four, the amount 
of fluctuating certainty seemed to be more of an individual difference 
than a group trend. Gould makes a clear distinction between believing 
one's own make-believe to the extent of becoming fearful (gone around 
age 2 - 2h) and believing the make-believe of another to a sufficient 
degree to become scared. Three to five year old children would probably 
not scare themselves with their own fantasy, but might still get caught 
up in another's fantasy or in an interactional process. Gould views 
fluctuating certainty as a transitional step in the child's understanding
16
of the differences between real and make-believe. In terms of the 
child's understanding of himself, Gould's data seems to indicate that 
the child understands that his own self is not changeable via his own 
fantasy before he understands that he is unchangeable via others fan­
tasies. The child might not scare himself after age 2% with his own 
fantasy of being a witch. However, another's fantasy that portrays one 
as a witch may still be fairly real to the child of three or four.
Singer (1973), in a study of two to five year olds, seems to add 
additional information to Gould's research. Comparing a free play set­
ting with a structured one, it was found that there was much more make- 
believe play in the free play setting. Within the free play setting, 
Singer found an increasing amount of make-believe play with increasing 
age from three to five years old. Singer did not attempt to distinguish 
how "real" the children's make-believe was, but simply noted that there 
was more of it with increasing age. The addition that Singer makes to 
Gould's study may be that while make-believe is becoming less "real" 
with increasing age, it is also becoming more abundant. Perhaps there 
is an elaboration of the symbolic function occurring such that make- 
believe play, rather than evidencing a lack of a stable concept of self, 
may serve to help the child differentiate himself and increase the sta­
bility of his concept of self.
Tizard, Phelps and Plewis (1976) also found an increase in sym­
bolic play with age for three and four year olds, but the correlation 
between age and symbolic play was rather low (+.30) indicating again
that a good deal of individual differences were confounding any possible'
developmental trends.
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Aggernaes and Haugsted (1976) in a study of experienced reality 
in three to six year old children essentially found three year olds to 
be quite different from the older children. The three year olds exhib­
ited a much greater tendency to experience imaginary items as being like 
real items, as well as a tendency for magical thinking. The children 
were questioned about four kinds of real items and two kinds of imaginary 
items. The children's responses to questions were rated on a scale of 
qualities of the objects (can it be touched, can it be seen, do others 
see it, etc.). Their scale indicated that the tendencies exhibited by 
the three year olds declined a good deal by the age of four or five and 
were gone for most of the children by age six. This would seem to indi­
cate that the fantasy world of children under age four may not be very 
differentiated from their view of the real world. This too would seem 
to agree with the hypothesis that around age four, the world and self 
become more differentiated even though the amount of make-believe play 
engaged in may be increasing.
Schempp-Matthews (1977), working with four year olds, investi­
gated whether children's fantasies were internally or externally gener­
ated. She found a fairly even balance between fantasy that was trig­
gered by the external environment and that which was generated from 
within by the child. Though there is no data provided for other age 
groups, these results would seem to indicate that at least four year 
olds are readily open to fantasy play. Since, according to Piaget, sym­
bolic play does not begin until the child is a year and a half or two 
years old, it would seem that between the ages of two and four, symbolic 
thinking increases rapidly. Before symbolic thought is available to the
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child, his play is oriented only to physically present objects which 
only served to represent themselves. With the beginning of symbolic 
thought, the child can use one object to stand for another and compare a 
present object with one imagined. The child can also imagine himself as 
different from his present state of being through make-believe. Accord­
ing to Schempp-Matthews' study it seems that this process is operating
'
very well by age four, since the child can equally draw from the environ­
ment or create his make-believe solely from imagination without the 
impetus of props.
Golomb and Brandt-Cornelius (1977) took research involving make- 
believe one step further and investigated the effects of make-believe on 
the conservation ability of four year old children. The experimental 
group of 15 nonconservers was given three sessions of symbolic play.
The control group of 15 nonconservers was also given three play sessions
'
but these were structured with puzzles, mosaics, and drawing. On con­
servation posttests, 13 of the children in the experimental group 
improved in conservation ability, four of these obtaining full conserva­
tion. Only one child from the control group showed any positive change 
toward conservation on the posttests. The authors argue that the same 
processes may be underlying both conservation and symbolic play. Both 
symbolic play and conservation involve reversibility and transformations. 
In conservation tasks, a ball of clay is transformed into a sausage 
shape, or a cup of water is transformed into a tall thin tube of water.
In symbolic play, the transformation is imaginary but one object becomes 
another and is transformed into it. In conservation, the concept of 
reversibility is necessary to understand that the altered object can be
put back the way it was originally. In symbolic play, reversibility too 
seems to be present as a broom can turn into a horse and then back into 
a broom again. The authors hypothesize that symbolic play may be an 
important antecedent of operational reversibility. If this is true, it 
might also be true that symbolic play involving the self may be a pre­
cursor to the attainment of a stable sense of self.
Transmutation of Animals and the Self
De Vries (1969) in what has now become a classic study, 
attempted to investigate children's belief as to whether a living animal 
can change into a different animal and to what degree this change is 
believed by the children to be a real transformation. The subjects were 
64 boys aged three to six years. They were shown an animal (cat) which 
then changed identity via a mask to either a dog or rabbit while remain­
ing in the child's presence. The results showed a decrease in belief 
that the transformation was real with an increase in age. Other 
Piagetian tasks given the children (conservation of number, length and 
volume) correlated more strongly with generic identity constancy than 
did discrimination measures used to determine if the children could 
define and tell the differences between cats, dogs, and rabbits. De 
Vries concluded that constancy could not be attributed to acquisition of 
knowledge or discrimination ability but was evidence of the kind of cog­
nitive changes discussed by Piaget. The measures of fear reaction to 
the animal also seemed to indicate the reality of the children's belief 
in the transformation which provides further evidence that the children's
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experience of reality is different from the adult's because of a quali­
tatively different cognitive structure.
As a corollary to the main part of her study, De Vries (1969) 
investigated children's reactions to the experimenter and the child him­
self wearing an animal mask. She found that this human identity task 
was much easier for the children than the task involving the living ani­
mal, though there was an increasing disbelief in the transformation with 
increasing age of the child. There were some problems with this task, 
however, in that the masks were very unlifelike while the masks that the 
animal wore were very lifelike. This makes comparison between the two 
rather difficult. Another problem was that there were many more clues 
available to help decide if a man has turned into a wolf, as opposed to 
whether a cat has turned into a dog. Nevertheless, 23% of the three 
year olds and 6% of the four year olds failed to assert that they were 
not a real chicken or wolf while wearing the masks. Even with the 
unrealistic masks, the younger children were still somewhat uncertain 
that they could not change into an animal. Another problem with this 
portion of De Vries study was the scale which was used as a scoring sys­
tem. The scale consisted of: (a) says he is not real chicken or wolf 
while wearing mask, (b) says _E is not real chicken or wolf when .E wears 
mask, (c) says _E is neither real chicken nor real wolf, (d) says he is 
neither real chicken nor real wolf, (e) says _E is not chicken or wolf, 
(f) and says IS is neither chicken nor wolf. These distinctions seem to 
be rather fine for a three to six year old child to be making with any 
degree of understanding. A simpler scoring system and one which is more 
involved with the transformational nature of the situation might be more
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appropriate. Perhaps if the masks were more realistic and some of the 
other human characteristics (clothes, arms, legs) were covered, the data 
for humans wearing a mask might be more similar to the data for the ani­
mal wearing a mask. As De Vries' data stand, they appear to support the 
hypothesis that the sense of self as unchangeable occurs prior to the 
attainment of the same concept regarding other living creatures. This 
seems to agree with Gould's (1972) observations of not believing ones 
own fantasies beyond the age of three, but still believing those of 
another. Murray's (1969) data seem to contradict these studies though, 
since on his conservation tasks the children were able to conserve a 
ball of clay more easily than their own body. This seems to question 
whether conservation of self and sense of self as unchangeable are dif­
ferent processes or occur at different ages or stages of cognitive 
development.
The Purpose of the Present Study
The present study seeks to extend De Vries' (1969) and Murray's 
(1969) work to measure children's understanding of both the transmut­
ability of themselves and the conservation of their own bodies. Though 
it would seem that these two concepts would appear developmentally at 
different ages, except for Murray's single report, there are no data 
regarding children's development of conservation of self. The concepts 
of conservation of self and the immutability or stability of self do 
share some common elements. Both relate to possible changes in the body 
while trying to determine if the body has really changed either in mass, 
weight, length, or identity.
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Sometime between four and seven years of age a change occurs in 
the way children think which provides them with a more adult perspective 
about whether objects or they themselves can be transformed into some­
thing different. It is also during this time that the child moves 
toward and enters the stage of concrete operations and begins to master 
the conservation tasks. It is hypothesized that there should be an age 
progression toward a more stable and unchangeable sense of self, along 
with an increased ability on the part of the child to conserve his own 
body. Conservation of external objects should be attained at a later 
age than conservation of self. It is not clear from the literature 
whether these concepts will be correlated with one another, but if they 
turn out to be, it would support a cognitive interpretation of make- 
believe regarding the self and allow the child's development of a sense 
of self to be understood in the same terms as the development of his 
understanding of objects in the environment.
The literature does seem to indicate that make-believe play may 
be connected to the development of cognitive abilities (Golomb & Brandt- 
Cornelius, 1977) and that some of Piaget's cognitive tasks may be 
related to the child's understanding of the transmutability of animals 
and the child himself (De Vries, 1969). Further investigation into the 
possibility of a connection between cognitive development, make-believe 
play, and the child's sense of self seems warranted. The following 
research was designed to add further information toward an understanding 
of a possible connection between the child's cognitive development, his 




Seventy children were involved in the study, 14 from each of 
five age groups. The age groups were 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 years old. The 
mean age, in months, for each of the age groups was: 44.1, 55.4, 64.2, 
77.1, and 89.2. Sex was equalized within each age group. The younger 
children were from a day care center, the older children from the Grand 
Forks, North Dakota school system. For all of the children, a signed 
letter of permission was obtained from their parents, and no child was
forced to participate. The children were chosen at random from those
■
whose parents had given permission, until each of the age and sex cate- 
gories were filled. Appendix A provides a copy of the permission let­
ters which were sent to parents.
Materials 
H------------------------
A bird-like mask with breast plate was used as the costume. It 
covered the children from head to mid-thigh, excluding the arms of the 
child (see Appendix B). Eye holes allowed the children to see them­
selves in a 24" x 48" mirror. The materials for the conservation tasks 
were: Play Doh clay; two sticks 24" long, one of which could be bent at 
two joints; an inclined plane measuring 24" long, 12" wide, and varying 
in height from 1" to 7"; a bathroom scale; and a polaroid camera. Five
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sets of three drawings depicting a child, a child with an animal mask 
on, and an animal were also used. The pictures are depicted in Appendix 
C.
Procedure
Each child was interviewed individually with only the experi­
menter present. The experimenter was previously unknown to the children. 
There were three parts to the study. The first involved the child wear­
ing a costume and looking at himself in a mirror. The second involved 
conservation tasks where both external objects and the child's own body 
were the objects of the conservation questions. The third part involved 
asking the child questions about pictures of people, animals, and people 
in animal costumes. All of the children in the study participated in 
all three sections. The three Sections were always presented to the 
children in the same sequence; Part 1, Part 2, Part 3. Total experi­
mental time with each child was 10 to 15 minutes.
Part 1 (Transformation of Self)
Each child was taken individually and asked a few questions 
about himself while looking in a full length mirror. The questions 
were: "What is your name? Are you a boy or a girl? How old are you? 
When you grow up will you be a mommy or a daddy?" The child was then 
asked, in the gender opposite to the response to the last question,
"Could you be a mommy (daddy) if you wanted?" Then the bird costume was 
presented and the child was asked, "What is it?" If the child did not 
respond correctly, or didn't know, the child was told that it was a bird.
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The child was then asked to put the costume on and look in the mirror. 
Then the experimenter asked: "What is that in the mirror? Is that you 
(child's name) or a bird? Are you a little boy (girl) or are you a 
bird?" If the response to the last question was "bird," then the experi­
menter asked the following: "Can you fly? (If yes) Let me see you fly. 
(If the child flaps his arms) I see that you're trying to fly, but you 
are still on the ground. (Wait for explanation) But don't birds fly?" 
Then the child was asked to continue looking in the mirror to insure 
that he was still viewing himself and asked, "If you are a bird, 
what happened to the little boy (girl) that was just here?" Finally, 
all children were asked, "Are you really a bird or are you just pretend­
ing?" The experimenter recorded the children's responses to each of 
the six questions pertinent to their wearing of the mask. The scoring 
sheet is provided in Appendix D. This part of the study was also tape 
recorded so that the children's responses could be double checked.
Part 2 (Conservation of Self and Objects)
Again, each child was interviewed individually. There were ten 
tasks to this part of the experiment. The order of presentation was 
randomly assigned to prevent any order effects. There were four con­
servation of length tasks, two involving external objects and two 
involving the child's body. Two wooden sticks were presented, one of 
which could be bent in a zig-zag fashion. The body correlate of this 
task was the child comparing his two legs in the mirror and then bending 
one and being asked again if they were still the same length or was one 
now longer than the other. The third conservation of length task
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involved comparing two equal length sticks placed on a flat table and 
then placed on a wedge platform. The fourth task was very similar 
except instead of using sticks on the wedge, the child was asked to look 
in the mirror at his legs and then to stand on the wedge platform and 
again compare the length of his legs.
There were also four conservation of mass tasks. One involved 
clay, one used pictures of a child in several positions, and the two 
others involved the child's own body. A standard conservation of mass 
task was employed, with two equal balls of clay being compared, and then 
one of them being flattened into a pancake shape for a second comparison. 
A similar conservation of mass task was employed using the child's hands 
instead of the clay. The comparison was made between one hand being 
outstretched (pancake) and the other hand held in a fist (ball). The 
third conservation of mass task involved the child's entire body. The 
child compared him/herself in front of a mirror in a crouched position 
(ball) and standing upright with arms and legs spread outward (pancake).
A possible problem was thought to exist in this third comparison how­
ever, since the child could not view himself in the two positions simul­
taneously. An additional method was thus devised where polaroid pic­
tures were taken of a child crouched and extended so that a direct vis­
ual comparison was possible. This picture comparison constituted the 
fourth conservation of mass task and was considered an external task.
The conservation of weight tasks were also divided into one 
using external materials and one using the child's own body. For the 
external conservation of weight task, two clay balls were used with one 
being subsequently rolled into a sausage shape for a second comparison.
27
In front of the mirror, the child then stood on a bathroom scale, both 
in an erect position and while crouched down into a ball for a compari­
son of the weight of his own body. The format ard each of the questions 
asked of the children for this part of the experiment are presented in 
Appendix E.
Part 3 (Continuity of Person)
Before the tasks of this section began, a brief pretest was 
given to insure that the childrep understood the concept of same and 
different. This pretest consisted of several matching tasks involving 
geometric figures. One example was the presentation of two squares and 
a triangle and the child was asked to point to the two which are the 
same. All of the children involved in this study understood the concept 
of same and different as assessed by this pretest. Following the pre­
test, the child was shown five sets of three pictures. The series of 
pictures all followed the format of one drawing of a person, one drawing 
of an animal, and one drawing of a person with an animal mask on. The 
order in which the animal, person, and costumed person appeared was ran­
domized among the five sets of pictures. The child was first asked to 
identify each picture. After this description of the pictures, the 
child was asked to look at the pictures and decide in a forced choice 
which two were the same. If the child picked the two people pictures as 
the same, then it was assumed that the child understood the concept of 
continuity of person. If the ctiild picked the animal and the costumed 
person as the same, then the child would seem to view the person as 
being able to change into an animal, or at least more like an animal




Responses to Part 1 were scored as either a one of zero for each 
of the six questions which the child was asked while wearing the bird 
costume. The six questions were ordered in such a way that each suc­
ceeding question should be harder to score a one if the child understood 
that he had not become a bird but remained himself. The results section 
presents the outcome of a Guttman scalogram analysis to determine 
whether the questions were indeed ordered by difficulty.
Part 2
The children's responses to the tasks of Part 2 were scored on a 
pass-fail basis, depending on whether the child did or did not conserve. 
If the child did not volunteer an explanation, the child was asked,
"why" following their initial answer. Each of the conservation tasks 
was scored separately.
Part 3
Responses to Part 3 were scored either 0 or 1, depending on 
whether the child preserved the person, choosing the two human figures, 
or whether the child chose the animal and the masked person as being the 
same. The range of scores on this section could thus vary from 0 to 5 
for each child, since there were five picture series presented.
Experimental Design
Part 1
Children's responses across age groups were compared to deter­
mine if the age groups differed in their beliefs about the transforma­
tion of self. The Mann-Whitney U test was employed since the data were 
ordinal in nature and the age groups were independent of one another.
Part 2
The children's responses across age groups were compared to 
determine if the age groups differed in their ability to pass the con­
servation tasks. A Mann-Whitney U test was used for this analysis. A 
test was also performed across age groups comparing performance on the 
external and all the body conservation tasks. The external conservation 
tasks were also compared with only the three entire-body conservation 
tasks which used the child's entire body instead of just a part of the 
child's body. Both of these analyses employed the Wilcoxon Matched- 
pairs Signed-ranks test. A fourth analysis was performed within each 
age group, comparing performance on the conservation of weight with per­
formance on the conservation of mass with performance on the conserva­
tion of length tasks. A Friedman two-way analysis of variance test was 
used for this analysis, since tbe data were ordinal and involved three 
related samples. A Spearman's rho correlation was also computed compar­




The children's responses to the continuity of person task were 
compared across age groups to determine if the age groups differed in 
the way they responded to this task. A Mann-Whitney U test was employed
since the data were ordinal and the groups were independent. A Spear­
man's rho correlation was also computed comparing the children's scores 
on Part 3 with Part 1, and their scores on Part 3 with Part 2. A Mann- 
Whitney U test was used to test for sex differences on each of the three 
parts of the experiment.
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Based on Mann-Whitney U tests, there were no significant sex 
differences in the way the children responded to any of the tasks in 
this experiment. All further analysis thus combined the sexes within 
each age group. The total score for each subject on each of the tasks 
is presented in Appendix G.
The scale which was developed for Part 1 (Transmutation of Self) 
was analyzed to assess whether children passing any specific item also 
passed all of the preceding items. A coefficient of reproducibility of 
.983 was obtained, indicating that the questions did form a reproducible 
Guttman scale. Table 1 presents the scale questions and the manner in 
which the children responded.
Using this scale as the basis of scoring the children's responses 
to Part 1, only one of the age groups was significantly different from 
the rest. The four year olds scored significantly higher (less stability 
of sense of self) than all other age groups (see Table 2). The average 
four year old responded that the image in the mirror was a bird, that it 
was a bird and not he when he was called by name, and that he was a bird 
and not a boy (girl). The average three, five, six, and seven year old 
said that it was a bird in the mirror, but did not deny their own name 
nor sex. The means and significance levels for each age group are 
presented in Table 2.
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PERCENTAGES BY AGE GROUP OF CHILDREN ANSWERING EACH QUESTION
IN THE DIRECTION OF "BIRDNESS" TO THE QUESTIONS OF PART 1
AGE
Questions Three Four Five Six Seven
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TABLE 1
N 1i N % N % N % N %
1. Bird in Mirror 12 85 13 92 13 92 13 92 12 85
2. Bird over Name 5 35 13 92 8 57 6 42 6 42
3. Bird over Sex 1 7 7 50 4 28 4 28 3 21
4. Can Fly or Excuse 
for not Flying
1 7 6 42 0 0 2 14 1 7
5. Excuse for Vanished 
Boy/Girl •
0 0l 3 21 1 7 2 14 3 21
6. Really Bird and 
not Pretend
0 Ci 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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MEAN AND MEDIAN SCORES PER AGE GROUP AND STATISTICALLY 
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AGE GROUPS ON PART 1
TABLE 2
Age Four Five Six Seven
Three _
year X = 1.35 U = 29.5** U = 72 U = 78 U = 88
olds Mdn = 1.21
Four
year X = 3.00
olds Mdn = 2.50 -------  U = 49.5* U = 49* U = 44.5*
Five _ 
year X = 1.85
olds Mdn = 1.50 U = 49.5* -------  U = 93 U = 110
Six _
year X = 1.93 U = 49* U = 93 -----  U = 88
olds Mdn = 1.37
Seven
year X = 1.78 U = 44.5* U = 110 U = 88
olds Mdn = 1.25
** £<. .01
* £  <..05
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Four additional three year olds who were tested on Part 1 
refused to put on the mask. These four subjects were not included in 
the analysis since there was no way to give them a score on this task.
Two of these children would not even allow the experimenter to put on 
the mask. No children in any other age group refused to participate.
On Part 2 (Conservation of Self and External Objects), a Mann- 
Whitney U test revealed that for total conservation scores, the seven 
year olds scored significantly higher than the six year olds (U = 48,
£  < .05), significantly higher than the five year olds (U = 27.5, £  < 
.01), significantly higher than the four year olds (U = 12.5, £ < .01), 
and significantly higher than the three year olds (U = 10.5, £ < .01).
On the average, the seven year olds passed nearly six of the ten con­
servation tasks while the other age groups passed three or less. None 
of the other age groups were significantly different from one another, 
although their means presented in Table 3 indicate a clear progression 
with age for these conservation tasks.
Several of the three year old children had to be tested twice on 
the conservation tasks. They initially responded in the affirmative to 
whatever the experimenter said last. This method of responding yielded 
a spuriously high score for these few children on the conservation tasks. 
Upon retesting, it was discovered that the children were indeed respond­
ing in this way. When questioned further, and the order of presenting 
the choice of answers was altered, their responses indicated that they 
were obviously not conserving.
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TABLE 3
A COMPARISON OF NUMBER OF BODY AND EXTERNAL CONSERVATION TASKS PASSED
Body Tasks External Tasks All Tasks
Age n Number Mean/ Number Mean/ Number Mean/
Median Median Median
Three 14 10 .71 3 .22 13 .93
1.00 .64 .70
Four 14 13 .93 11 .78 24 1.71
.70 .79 1.50
Five 14 15 1.07 14 1.00 29 2.07
1.10 1.00 1.50
Six 14 25 1.80 19 1.36 44 3.16
1.10 1.00 1.30
Seven 14 39 2.78 43 3.07 82 5.85
3.50 3.10 6.83
All 70 102 1.46 90 1.28 192 2.74
1.07 .81 1.64
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Comparing the Body with the external conservation tasks, the 
only statistically significant difference was for the three year old age 
group (T = 4, £ < .05), based on the Wilcoxon Matched-pairs Signed-ranks 
test. This difference was in favor of the body conservation tasks 
(i.e., three year olds conserved their body more frequently than they 
did external objects). However, as Table 4 indicates, the rate at which 
the three year olds passed the conservation tasks was very low. Out of 
a possible 140 passes, only 10 body and 3 external conservation tasks 
were passed. Three body tasks accounted for 9 of the passes and it was 
found that these three tasks were the ones that involved the child's 
entire body. The tasks using body parts (hands, legs) were not passed 
more often than the tasks which used external objects. A second analy­
sis of external vs. entire-body conservation tasks was thus computed 
using only those body tasks which involved the entire child this time.
For all ages combined, the difference was now highly significant (£ = 
7.16, £  < .001). As shown in Table 4, broken down by age groups, the 
three year olds, five year olds, and six year olds were all significantly 
higher on the body tasks, and the four year olds approached significance. 
The seven year olds responses to the body and external tasks were still 
essentially equivalent.
The conservation of weight, mass, and length tasks were also 
compared for differences in pass rate by age group. Based on a Friedman 
Two-way Analysis of Variance, the rate of success was not found to be 
significantly different for any of the three conservation categories 
(X̂  = 4.9, N.S.). A Spearman's rho correlation was computed comparing 
the scores of Part 1 with the total conservation scores of Part 2. The
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MEANS FOR ENTIRE-CHILD AND EXTERNAL CONSERVATION TASKS ALONG 
WITH STATISTICAL DIFFERENCES BASED ON THE WILCOXON 
MATCHED-PAIRS SIGNED-RANKS TEST
TABLE 4
Age n Entire-body tasks External tasks T £
(Means weighted by 5/3)
X X
3 8 1.07 .22 2, .02
4 10 1.30 .78 12, .11
5 10 1.67 1.00 5, .02
6 11 2.02 1.36 7, .02
7 13 2.85 3.07 49, N.S.
correlation was positive but low and not statistically significant 0: =
.17,, N.S.). A Spearman's rho correlation was also computed comparing
the entire-body conservation tasks with Part 1 scores. This correlation
was also nonsignificant (£ = -.005, N.S.).
Taken as a whole, the data from Part 3 (Continuity of Person) 
was unanalyzable by statistical methods. A large enough percentage 
(41%) of the children responded to the task in an unpredicted manner so 
that the scoring system became unusable for all children. Some of the 
children's responses were such that they did not fit into the numbered 
scoring system. An attempt was made to separate out the children who 
did respond in a scorable manner. The criterion used was whether the 
child's explanation of his answer referred to a general class rather
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than specific features of the pictures (e.g., both animals or both boys 
was acceptable, while responses such as both have the same heads or both 
have pink dresses were deemed unacceptable). Using this criterion, the 
number of usable subjects fell to 41. These 41 children were comprised 
of 10 three year olds, 9 four year olds, 7 five year olds, 8 six year 
olds, and 8 seven year olds.
A Kruskal-Wallis One-Way Analysis of Variance was computed for 
this subset of 41 children, and significant age differences were found 
for the way these children responded on Part 3 (H = 11, £ < .05). Using 
a Mann-Whitney JJ test to compare each age group with every other, it was 
found that the 3, 4, and 5 year olds responses were not significantly 
different from one another. As seen in Table 5, the six year olds 
responses were significantly different from the five year olds, from the 
four year olds, and from the three year olds. Likewise, the seven year 
olds were significantly different from the five year olds, from the four 
year olds, and from the three year olds. The six and seven year olds 
were not significantly different from one another. On the average, the 
six and seven year olds responded to the task in the same way, they pre­
served the continuity of person on four or more of the five tasks. On 
the average, the three, four, and five year olds preserved the continu­
ity of person on only one or two of the five sets of pictures.
A Spearman's rho correlation was then computed using the sub­
sample of 41 children to compare their scores on Part 3 with their 
scores on Part 1. The correlation was essentially zero (r = .03, N.S.). 
Spearman's rhos were also computed comparing the entire-body conserva­
tion tasks with Part 3 (r = -.15, N.S.) and the total conservation
MEAN SCORES PER AGE GROUP AND MANN-WHITNEY U 
FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AGES FOR PART 3
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TABLE 5
Age Mean/ Four Five Six Seven
Median
3 3.80 U = 34 U = 26.5 U =  7.2** U = 7.5**
4.50
4 2.66 - U = 31.5 U = 21* U = 21*
4.50
5 2.71 U = 31.5 - U = 16* U = 16*
5.00
6 .62 U = 21* U = 16* - U = 32
1.50
7 .62 U = 21* U = 16* U = 32
1.37
**£ < .05
*£  < .10
scores with Part 3 (r = -.22, N.S.). Both of these correlations were 
in the expected direction, but nonsignificant.
Based on the significant differences between the ages on the 
various tasks, the tasks seem to order themselves by age, in terms of 
difficulty. The mask task (Part 1, Transmutation of Self) would seem to 
be mastered first, followed by the picture task (Part 3, Continuity of 
Person) and entire-body conservation tasks (Part 2), in turn followed by 
the external conservation tasks (Part 2). To determine if the tasks
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were passed in this sequence for each individual child, the tasks were 
ordered into a scale. The median score for each task was used as the 
cutoff for passing the task. Only the 41 subjects who responded in a 
scorable fashion to Part 3 were included in this scaling attempt.
Scaled in the order presented above, a coefficient of reproducibility of 
.872 was obtained. This outcome was considered conservative, since 
ordinal data were forced into nominal categories for the purposes of the 
scaling. It is also considered conservative since the number of sub­
jects above and below the median was not always 50%, thus sometimes 
leaving less than half of the Ss passing a task. The occurrence of this 
lower pass rate in the tasks scaled first and second worked against the 
"goodness" of the scale since there were fewer "+"s on the first two
tasks and more later on.
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Briefly, the results of Part 1 indicate that the four year olds 
responded differently to questions about their identity while wearing a 
mask than did any of the other age groups. The four year olds seemed to 
exhibit much more confusion about whether they could turn into a bird 
than did the other children. This task was not correlated with either 
the children's conservation scores (Part 2) or their scores on a picture 
task designed to measure continuity of person (Part 3). The results 
from Part 2 (Conservation of Self and External Objects) indicate that 
the attainment of conservation concepts about one's own body as a whole 
may occur earlier than these same concepts when the reference objects 
are ones hands or legs or when they are external objects. It was also 
found that the seven year olds differed significantly from the other age 
groups, demonstrating their increased ability to conserve. The results 
from Part 3 (Continuity of Person) seem to indicate that the six and 
seven year olds preserved the concept of humanness on this task signifi­
cantly more often than the younger children in this sample. No sex dif­
ferences were found on any of the tasks.
The hypothesis of a growing sense of self and a more differen­
tiated concept of make-believe as opposed to "reality" is supported by 
the data from Part 1. The four year olds displayed a less stable sense 
of self on the mask task than the five, six and seven year olds. At
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first glance, the three year olds responses, which were similar to the 
older children's, do not seem to fit into this explanation. However, 
several three year olds refused to participate in the mask task. These 
children were not less cooperative than other three year olds on the 
other tasks, but they refused to put on the mask. It seemed fairly 
clear that these children were afraid of the mask and afraid to put it 
on. If this type of fear can be attributed to the other three year olds 
who nevertheless went along with the experimenter's wishes, then it may 
be that the three year olds who did participate in the mask task were 
too frightened to allow themselves to engage in any fantasy regarding 
the mask. Perhaps it was simply too scary for them to "play" this game 
It was also noted that all of the three year olds seemed relieved to 
take off the mask after questioning, while a number of the older chil­
dren wanted to remain wearing the mask and asked if there were other 
masks that they could wear. It may be that the three year olds accepted 
the possibility of the mask changing them, to an equal or even greater 
extent than the four year olds. The difference may have been that the 
three year old's fear of the situation overrode any tendency they had to 
engage in make-believe while wearing the mask. This fear threshold may 
have been higher for the four year olds, so that they could more easily 
allow themselves to "become birds."
In a discussion with the director of the day care center about 
this hypothesis, she mentioned that around Halloween, the four and five 
year old children really enjoyed putting on masks and pretending, but 
most of the three year olds did not like Halloween and seemed to be gen­
uinely afraid of the masks and costumes. This fear theory is also
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somewhat consistent with that portion of De Vrie^ (1969) study in which 
the experimenter and the children put on a mask. De Vries found that 
the three year olds were much more apt to believe that they could change 
into the character of the mask than the four, five, and six year olds 
when the children themselves were wearing the mask. Although the pres­
ent study singles out only the four year olds, it seems reasonable that 
the real distinction is between the three to four year olds and the five 
to seven year olds. The evidence from Part 3 (Continuity of Person) 
also seemed to imply that the older children (this time the six and seven 
year olds) understood the concept of the permanence of the human form 
while the younger children had much more difficulty with this concept. 
This is not to say that there is a rapid transition point for any given 
child or even groups of children. The data here show a steady increase 
with age for both the conservation tasks and the picture tasks. What it 
does seem to indicate is that between the age of four and five, most 
children begin to more accurately differentiate their own being from 
other people and the inanimate world, and accept it as an essential and 
unchanging part of themselves.
If, as was hypothesized earlier, an increase in fantasy play 
marks this increasing process of differentiation, then the data seem to 
reinforce this notion. The three and four year old children seemed much 
more susceptible to the make-believe situation of putting on a mask.
After this age, the concepts of conservation of bodily self and person 
permanence, despite an apparent transformation of the body and person, 
began to develop more fully. Most authors have written that fantasy 
play tends to decrease from age five onward, and yet it is not until
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about age two that the symbolic function is developed to the extent that 
it becomes usable by the child to engage in fantasy play. It is between 
the ages of two and five, then, that fantasy play is at its height in 
children. It seems more than coincidental that the differentiation of 
self also seems to be occurring at this age and directly thereafter.
The results from Part 2 (Conservation of Self and External 
Objects) seem to indicate that the conservation of self may be more com­
plicated than it initially seemed. The conservation of self as an 
entire entity may occur prior to the same kinds of conservation tasks 
involving external objects. However, the conservation of body parts 
(hands and legs) does not seem to be different from the conservation of 
external objects. Except for th^ seven year olds, younger children 
apparently sense themselves as unchanging entities, but when confronted 
with particular parts of themselves, they view these as they do external 
objects. The question, then, is not only self versus external conserva­
tion, but whether or not the child has integrated his body parts as part 
of the self. The problem seems to go back to what Piaget (1962) men­
tioned as the child's inability as yet to understand the concept of the 
sum of the parts comprising the whole. When the entire range of body 
conservation tasks (including body parts) is considered, body conserva­
tion does not appear to occur at an earlier age than conservation of 
external objects. But body conservation, involving only the child's 
entire body, is mastered at a younger age than is conservation of exter­
nal objects. By the time the child is seven years old, this distinction 
disappears since the child can now conserve both his body and external 
objects to a much greater degree. It may be that body parts, as opposed
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to the body as a whole, are conceptualized in a manner similar to exter­
nal objects. By the time a child is seven years old, he can conserve 
body parts, since he can also conserve external objects at this age.
For younger children, the entire body (but not body parts) is differen­
tiated and understood while body parts and external objects are not yet 
conserved.
There were no significant differences in the number of children 
who were able to conserve length, mass, and weight. Theoretically, con­
servation of length, mass, and weight should appear developmentally in 
this order. These tasks were not so ordered in the present study, prob­
ably because of the young age of many of the subjects. The few conser­
vation tasks that were passed by the younger children were scattered 
among the three conservation areas and were largely due to the conserva­
tion of entire-body tasks, of which there were three, one each involving
conservation of length, mass, and weight. Generally, the great vari­
ability on these tasks for the younger children and the higher pass rate 
for the three entire-body tasks, than the more conventional external 
conservation tasks, accounts for the lack of significant differences 
between the three conservation areas.
The conservation tasks did not correlate with the mask task 
(Part 1). Earlier research (De Vries, 1969; Gould, 1972; Murray, 1969) 
seemed to indicate that these two areas might not be correlated if the 
ages at which the children mastered the two concepts differed too much. 
In this way, one task could be fully mastered before the other task 
began to get passed. Then no matter what score the child obtained on
the second task, his score on the first task would always be the same so
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that there could be no relationship between the tasks and the correla­
tion would be zero. To some extent, this seems to be what has occurred 
here. Another explanation may be that the two areas are separately 
developing concepts, although the work of Golomb and Brandt-Cornelius 
(1977), who found that make-believe play sessions raised scores on con­
servation tasks, would seem to dispute this. More likely, it seems that 
the kind of self differentiation that allows the child to clearly sepa­
rate reality from make-believe is an earlier developing concept than is 
conservation. It also seems to be an earlier developing concept than 
the concept of preservation of humanness as a general construct, if the 
third part of the present study can be taken as indicative of this. The 
picture task used here (Part 3) seemed to be tapping children's under­
standing of the preservation of humanness as an unchanging ability. On 
this task, the 3, 4, and 5 year olds were significantly different from 
the 6 and 7 year olds, while on the mask task (Part 1) the 3 and 4 year 
olds (if it can be conceded that the 3 year olds were too fearful to 
engage in make-believe in this setting) responded significantly different 
than the 5, 6, and 7 year olds. However, none of the tasks were signif­
icantly correlated with one another. This makes it difficult to suppose 
an underlying process of cognitive development which these tasks have in 
common. Nonetheless, they do seem to order themselves in terms of dif­
ficulty. When the children were divided into those who scored above and 
those who scored below the median score for each task, the tasks formed 
a reasonably reproducible scale (coefficient of reproducibility = .872). 
Table 6 presents the tasks in order, with the addition of the development 
of gender identity based on Kohlberg's (1966) study and the fact that
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TABLE 6
POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTAL SEQUENCE OF THE CHILD’S SENSE OF SELF, 
BASED ON KOHLBERG (1966) AND THE PRESENT STUDY
1. Gender Identity 2 and 3 year olds different from older children.
2. Mask on Self 3 and 4 year olds different from older children.*
3. Pictures of Human 3, 4, and 5 year olds different from older
Transformatiorl children.
4. Entire-Body 3, 4, and 5 year olds different from older
Conservation children.
5. External 3, 4, 5, ,and 6 year olds different from older
Conservation children.
*see text for explanation
only two children in the present study claimed that they could become an 
opposite sex parent when they grew up. As illustrated, gender identity 
seems to develop first, followed by the mask task, and then the picture 
task and the conservation of the child's entire body. Conservation of 
the child's body parts and external objects is a later developing abil­
ity.
However, it must be reiterated that the tasks in this study were 
not significantly correlated with one another. Though the scaling indi­
cates that they are ordered in terms of difficulty, it does not indicate 
that one task is a precursor to the next task. It might be, as Golomb 
and Brandt-Cornelius (1977) suggest, that make-believe is a precursor to 
conservation, but the two still remain uncorrelated in this study, at 
least. The age difference between when the children attain the concepts
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of each of the tasks would have to be almost completely separate. It 
could be argued that the conservation task was largely directed toward 
the six and seven year old children while the mask task was directed 
more toward the three and four year old children. The results would 
seem to indicate that this is the case. But if that is true, it leaves 
any possible relationship between the two open only to speculation.
The picture task (Part 3), which should occur between the mask 
task and conservation, was also uncorrelated with both. Perhaps though, 
with all of the difficulty encountered with the scoring of the picture 
task (Part 3) the results obtained on that section of the study should 
be treated with much caution. In any case, it would seem unwise to 
expect any kind of picture task to represent the child's sense of self. 
Although the preservation of humanness would seem to be related to one's 
sense of self, it appears that these concepts, at least as measured 
here, are not related. It would seem that the preservation of humanness 
in people in general is different from how one experiences oneself. 
"Self" may be a much more abstract concept than "human," in that the 
concept of "human" (as opposed to cat or horse) is a more easily defin­
able category. Although the children could relate pictures one to 
another, they probably did not relate the concept of humanness to them­
selves. The children dealt with the specific pictures in a concrete 
manner and did not seem to make the conceptual leap that the concept 
applies to all humans including themselves. This would not be unex­
pected from preoperational children. The use of pictures with this age 
group may simply be asking too much from the children, since children of 
these ages tend to deal with concrete and specific objects without
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generalizing them to classes of objects. To them, the pictures did not 
refer to anything but the specific object, animal, or person that each 
picture portrayed. To the adult, the pictures are symbols that stand 
for whole sets of objects. To the young child, the pictures do not rep­
resent a larger class but only a specific object or person (Piaget, 
1962).
.
Generally, the results here do not specifically support nor dis- 
pute Piaget, but may add to his theory of cognitive development as it 
applies to the development of the child's concept of self. Pretending 
one is a bird in the mask task is indicative of a preponderance of 
assimilation occurring. Choosing the masked person and animal as the 
same on the picture task is one step removed from the live situation and 
the set of the task itself (choose two) forces the child toward using 
more adaptive thought. And, of course, to pass the conservation tasks, 
the child must be using both assimilation and accommodation on a more 
equal basis. The results seem to order these tasks in a manner that 
Piaget might predict based on the child's increasing equilibrium between 
assimilation and accommodation as he grows older. That the tasks are 
uncorrelated may indicate that they do not represent a continuous dimen­
sion. Each of the tasks is not a precursor to the next. But the lack 
of correlation does not preclude that there may yet be an underlying 
pattern of cognitive development that accounts for their order of diffi­
culty. The rise of the symbolic function around age two essentially 
disrupts a kind of sensori-motor equilibrium that the child attained up 
to this point. Then through the ages of 3, 4, and 5, the symbolic func­
tion helps the child structure his world again, but this time relating
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specific present with certain past experiences. The symbolic function 
allows a greater time lag between these comparisons, and also allows the 
child to distort and shape his reality to his own egocentric thought.
As the child gets older, his thought becomes less distorting and more 
conventional in terms of shared realities with other people. Later 
still, as the child enters concrete operations, he begins to expand his 
comparisons between specific objects until he forms general classes of 
objects and the symbols he uses begin to represent a class of objects 
rather than one specific object.
The concept of self may follow this same sequence of development 
after the first differentiation of the self from the world, although it 
is at the same time easier and more difficult for the child. It is eas­
ier because the self is always present and it is through interactions of 
the self with the world that the child begins to understand the world. 
Objects in the world come and go as the child moves about, but his body 
and ego remain present. Thus, the self is an "object" with which the 
child has a great deal of experience. But the self would also seem to 
be more difficult to understand than an external object since it cannot 
be directly compared with itself in the present in the same way two cars 
or two blocks can be compared. An interesting speculation is whether 
the child compares himself with other people, perhaps peers or parents. 
Perhaps when a child is imitating others, he is trying to understand 
both himself and them. That the children are attempting to understand 
themselves as well as other people would seem to be a reasonable expla­
nation for their imitation. Of course, it would also tie into Piaget's 
theory that young children act put their thoughts and rehearsals through
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action schemes while older children and adults imitate and rehearse 
through imagination. Imitation in children may be an action schema that 
the children use to try and understand the world. It would certainly be 
of interest to measure developmentally children's tendency for imitation. 
Amount of imitation would probably be expected to be curvilinear much 
like the amount of fantasy play exhibited by children. It might steadi­
ly increase to a certain age and then begin to appear less frequently.
If imitation too could be understood in terms of cognitive development 
and the child's increasing understanding of himself and the world, play 
in all its aspects could be united under one theory. The three theories 
of play; as a cognitive function, as practice (imitation) for future 
activities, as an emotional release, would all be subsumed under a 
theory of cognitive processing. Even the child's fantasy play that 
seems to be directed by emotional situations or conflicts could be 
related back to the child's attempts to understand himself in relation 
to other significant people in his environment. This is not to say that 
this activity is directed only to the child's understanding of himself, 
or that it is limited to the ages of from three to five. Fantasy based 
on emotionally charged situations and imitation are a continuing process 
used throughout life to cope with situations that one doesn't understand. 
But in terms of the child's sense of self as a permanent psychological 
entity, these processes (fantasy imitation and emotional discharge) all 
seem to come together during the ages of three to five as this concept 
is developing. It may be that the concept of self is a very rapidly 
developing concept around the age of three or four years. The child has 
great experience with himself, but until the rise of the symbolic
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function it is difficult for him to compare himself with himself or 
others who are not present. All of the experimentation that the young 
child does with external objects he must do with himself. In a large 
part, this experimentation may be represented by make-believe play and 
imitation. Based on the present data, an increase in sense of self 
coincides with other data (Singer, 1973; Tizard et al., 1976) indicating 
an increase in make-believe play from ages three to five. In this study, 
conservation of ones own body also seems to occur during this time, 
while conservation of other objects doesn't appear until later. By age 
six or seven the children preserve a sense of humanness in pictures 
despite appearances of transformation. Between the ages of three and 
five the child's knowledge of himself seems to expand rapidly.
The child's understanding of his own gender constancy also seems 
to appear during the same age range as other measures of sense of self. 
The child's gender identity develops earlier, around age two, but chil­
dren do not perceive this gender as something permanent and unchangeable 
about themselves until about age three. The children do not view a pic­
tured person's sex as constant until about age six or seven (Emmerich, 
1973; Kohlberg, 1966). So, in gender identity studies, too, the child's 
understanding of self occurs prior to his understanding of others.
Whether the child's fantasy play is important in the child's 
development of gender identity seems as yet unexplored. The possibility 
would certainly seem to exist. Perhaps what other authors have called 
practice play in children (dressing up, playing mother, father, fireman, 
nurse, etc.), may actually be classified more generally as make-believe 
and serve the same function for the child as pretending to be superman,
spiderman, or even a horse or dog. The classification of practice play 
may not even be a relevant category of play if there is no functional 
difference between these practice play episodes and other fantasy play 
activities. The distinction is from an adult point of view and even 
then based on content and relationship to a possible future reality 
rather than the child's current experience and dealings with the world.
Implications fbr Childcare Workers
There seem to be many implications of this view of play and of 
the child's conceptualization of self occurring prior to similar con­
cepts about the environment. In terms of our understanding of children 
in general, it would be very parsimonious if a cognitive theory of devel­
opment could account for the myriad behaviors that occur during the 
young child's life. An understanding of the way children deal with 
their world and the cognitive tools which they possess to help them do 
this, would be very beneficial to anyone trying to help children in 
either an educational or clinical setting. In a day care or educational 
setting, the Golomb and Brandt-Cornelius (1977) study, where increased 
fantasy play produced increased conservation abilities, would seem to 
point the way. During the ages of three to five, make-believe and fan­
tasy play may be an important precursor to later conservation skills. 
Make-believe play might also help to more fully develop the child's 
sense of self and make him better able to cope with and understand social 
situations that might be different for young children. Make-believe and 
fantasy play could be encouraged with this age group to help the chil­
dren consolidate their sense of self. Fantasy play could also benefit
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the children as an aid in teaching them not only about themselves, but 
about the world in general. If make-believe helps the child understand 
himself and if an understanding of self precedes an understanding of the 
world, then both of these may be useful agents to help the child learn 
in any type of educational setting.
Since the use of allegory or metaphors is an effective technique 
in therapy with adults (desensitization), perhaps it is because it is 
analogous to fantasy play, an earlier mode of functioning (Singer, 1971). 
It is safer to try things out in fantasy and to think about an analogous 
situation to ones own in seeking an answer to a problem in living. Per­
haps there is more involved than an escape from the pressures of the 
real situation. It may be that this process has served and continues to 
serve people throughout their lives.
Directions for Future Research
Looking back at this study, some comments for future work seem 
appropriate. Comparing the mask task used by De Vries (1969) with the 
children and the mask task employed here, it seems that we made things 
unnecessarily difficult for ourselves. Asking the children whether they 
turned into a wolf or chicken, as De Vries did, or a bird as was done 
here seems to be pushing this phenomena to the extreme. De Vries com­
mented, and it applies here too, that the masks were not very realistic 
looking. She found this to be a problem in comparing the human transmu­
tation task with the animal transmutation task. Here it was less of a 
problem and, in fact, the mask was intentionally not constructed to be 
very realistic. To present the children with a costume that would
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visually transform them into a real-looking animal would defeat the 
intended purpose of this study. The question is not whether children 
can be convinced that they can change, but whether they themselves 
believe it at some time during the normal course of development. A 
realistic looking costume would not be representative of the child's 
normal play experience and, thus, not representative of the child's 
developing thought. Realistic-looking costumes simply are not avail­
able to children and it would be unreasonable to expect a child's reac­
tion to one to represent normal cognitive development in the child. One 
way in which future research might move is to get away from animal masks 
altogether and use human masks. An old man and old woman mask might be 
a good example. This kind of change of identity might be easier for the 
children to get involved in and would certainly add a new dimension to 
the mask task. As an example of what we are asking children to do, sup­
pose De Vries put a human mask on her cat instead of a dog or rabbit 
mask. Her results might be very different. Perhaps children acquire 
the concept that they can not change into an animal at one age, but they 
may still regard themselves as changeable within the realm of humanity. 
Another possibility might be to present the child with a choice of masks 
to try on. In this way, the children might select a mask that they 
could more easily pretend with than one arbitrarily chosen by the exper­
imenter. It might also be interesting to see if children of different 
ages choose differently between animal and human masks. A choice would 
certainly seem to facilitate the child's freedom to engage in make-
believe.
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As presented, the mask task has little to do with the child's 
normal make-believe behavior. Usually make-believe arises spontaneously 
during play, sparked by either an external prop or the child's own 
thoughts (Schempp-Matthews, 1977). To bring a child into a room and ask 
him questions about himself and then have him try on a mask and ask more 
questions about him is a far cry from the child's normal experience of 
make-believe. Most of the children interviewed merely stood in front of 
the mirror and looked passively at themselves without moving. In day-to- 
day make-believe play activities, the children are usually very physi­
cally active. Allowing the child a choice of several masks and encour­
aging movement might help free the child to become more active since he 
would have a hand in deciding what the make-believe might be.
As was mentioned earlier, the questions asked of the children 
while they were wearing the mask formed a very good Guttman scale. No 
scoring or interpretation was necessary since the questions themselves 
represented the scale. It seems that the questions used could easily be 
modified for use with a different mask (even human) and a group of 
scales could be developed if a choice of masks were offered the child.
If an experimenter wished to use a more relaxed free-play setting with 
the children, the scale questions could also be incorporated into a less 
formal conversation. Singer's (1973) research indicates that more make- 
believe occurs in a free-play setting than a structured one. Perhaps a 
free-play situation with masks available would be a good choice for 
further research in this area. In any case, the work done this far can 
only be considered inferential. Much more work in this area needs to be
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done before a clear understanding of the development of children's sense
of self is attained.
APPENDIX A
PERMISSION LETTERS SENT TO PARENTS
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THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA 
Grand Forks 58201
Department of Psychology Telephone: (701) 777-3451
Dear Parent,
Often, during play, children pretend to be someone or something dif­
ferent than themselves. 1 am currently studying children's beliefs 
about their ability to become something other than themselves. Essen­
tially, I am trying to discover how real children believe their make- 
believe to be. I will be working with children from age 3 to 8. With 
your permission, I would like to be able to talk with your child while 
he/she is at United Day Care. It will take about 15 minutes of the 
child's time, and no child will be forced who does not want to partici­
pate.
The study will involve trying on a costume and looking at oneself 
in a mirror. Questions will be asked as to whether he/she has changed 
into what the costume is, or whether they are still a boy/girl. Then a 
few tasks will be done to see if the child believes that body parts 
(hands, legs, arms) can change size. These tasks will be compared to 
similar ones involving common external objects. In this way, I hope to 
find out whether children understand concepts about themselves earlier 
or later than they do concepts about the external world.
Your child will at no time be endangered, and no intelligence or 
psychological testing will be done. We hope to make the experience 
enjoyable for the children. If you are willing to allow your child to 








THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA
Grand Forks 58201
Department of Psychology Telephone: (701) 777-3451
Dear Parent,
I am a graduate student at the University of North Dakota working 
on my dissertation project in psychology. I am doing a study on young 
children's beliefs about their ability to become something other than 
themselves. Make-believe or pretend occurs often in children's play and 
I am interested in how real this make-believe seems to the children them­
selves. I am working with children from 3 to 8 years of age. I would 
like to be able to spend about 15 minutes with your child while he/she 
is at Saint Michaels school. No child will be forced who does not want 
to participate.
The study will involve trying on a costume and looking at oneself 
in a mirror. Questions will be asked as to whether he/she has changed 
into what the costume is, or whether they are still a boy/girl. Then a 
few tasks will be done to see if the child believes that body parts 
(hands, legs, arms) can change size. These tasks will be compared to 
similar ones involving common external objects. In this way, I hope to 
find out whether children understand concepts about themselves earlier 
or later than they do concepts about the external world.
Your child will at no time be endangered, and no intelligence of 
psychological testing will be done. I hope to make the experience enjoy­
able for the children. If you have objections to your child partici­
pating in this study, please call me, Craig Stevens, at 777-3451 or the 
principal of St. Michael's school.
Thank you very much,
Craig Stevens, M.A. 
Psychology Department 







THE FIVE SETS OF THREE PICTURES USED IN PART 3

APPENDIX D












Bird in mirror Yes No
Bird over name Yes No
Bird over boy/girl Yes No
Can fly, or excuse
for not flying Yes No
Excuse for what
happened to boy/girl Yes No
Really a bird and
not pretend Yes No
AGE
APPENDIX E
INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN AND QUESTIONS ASKED THE CHILDREN 
DURING PART 2 (CONSERVATION OF SELF AND 
EXTERNAL OBJECTS)
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1. Sticks on Wedge. Stand two equal length sticks on a table 
directly in front of the child. Say, "Are these two sticks 
the same size, or is one longer than the other?" Wait for 
an affirmative answer. Then place the two sticks on the 
wedge, one at the top and one at the bottom. Say, "Now look 
at the sticks, are they the same size, or is one stick longer 
than the other?" Record response then ask "why?"
2. Child on Wedge. Have the child stand up and look at himself
in the mirror. Say, "Look at your legs, are they the same size, 
or is one leg longer than the other?" Wait for the child to 
say that they are the same. Have the child stand on the wedge 
in front of the mirror. Say, "Look at your legs now. Are they 
the same size, or is one leg longer than the other?" Record 
response and then ask "why?"
3. Sticks that Bend. Line the two sticks up, straight, parallel to 
each other. Ask the child, "Are these two sticks the same length?" 
Wait for the child to say that they are the same. Then bend one 
stick in a zig-zag fashion. Then say, "now are the sticks the same 
length or is one longer than the other?" Record response and then 
ask "why?"
4. Legs that bend. Have the child stand up in front of the mirror. 
Say, "Look at your legs, are they just as long as each other, or
is one leg longer than the other?" Wait for the response that they 
are the same length. Ask the child to stand on one leg with the
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other bent at the knee. Say, "Look at your legs now. Are they just 
as long as each other, or is one leg longer than the other?" Record 
response and ask "why?"
5. Clay Ball & Pancake (Conservation of Mass). Present the child with 
two balls of clay and ask if he thinks the two have the same amount 
of clay in them. If not, change them or let the child change them 
until the child says they are equal. Add or take away as the child 
wants, but make sure they retain their round shape. Then flatten 
one ball into a pancake. Say, "Is there more clay here (point to 
ball), more clay here (point to pancake), or is there the same amount 
of clay in both?" Record response and ask "why?"
6. Child Crouched vs. Arms & Legs Spread. Have the child stand in 
front of the mirror, with arms and legs spread out. Demonstrate if 
the child does not understand. Then have the child crouch down into 
a ball and look at himself in the mirror. Say, "Was there more of 
you when you had your arms and legs spread out or when you were in a 
ball, or was there the same amount of you both times?" If the child 
does not seem to understand, have him stand spread out and crouched 
again, as you ask the question. Record response and ask "why?"
7. Fist vs. Outstretched Palm. Have the child extend both hands, open, 
with palms up. Demonstrate if necessary. Say, "Is there more of
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you in one hand than the other, or are both hands just the same 
amount?" Wait for answer that they are the same. Then have the 
child make one hand into a fist while the other remains open. Say, 
"Now is there more of you in one hand than the other, or are both 
hands just the same amount?"
'
8. Clay Ball & Sausage (Conservation of Weight). Present two balls of 
clay and ask the child if he thinks that if you weighed them the two 
balls would weigh the same. Add or remove clay from one of the balls 
until the child thinks that they would weigh the same. Then roll 
one of the balls into a sausage shape and put it back on the table 
next to the ball of clay. Shy, "What would happen if I weighed them 
now? Would this one (ball) be heavier, or would this one (sausage) 
be heavier, or would they weigh the same?" Record response and ask 
"why?"
9. Child Crouched vs. Standing Straight. Place a scale in front of 
the mirror and ask the child to stand on the scale, standing 
straight, looking at himself in the mirror. Then, tell the child 
how much he weighs. Then have the child crouch down into a ball, 
while remaining on the scale. (Don't let the child see the scale 
reading.) Say, "Do you think that you weigh more now, or less, or 
do you weigh just the same as you did before?" Record response and 
ask "why?"
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10. Photograph Comparison. Show the child two photographs of a same 
sex child, one in which the child is standing with arms and legs 
spread out and the other with the child crouched down into a ball. 
Lay the photographs side by side and name the child saying, "These 
are two pictures of Billy (Sue)." Then say, "Is there more of 
Billy (Sue) in this picture, or in this picture, or is there just 
the same amount of Billy (Sue) in both pictures?" Record response 
and then ask "why?"
APPENDIX F
SCORING SHEET FOR PARTS 2 AND 3
NAME ________________________________ DATE _______
SEX ____________ BIRTH ______
AGE ________
ORDER _______________________________
Length 1. Sticks on wedge............ Pass Fail
2. Child on wedge............ Pass Fail
3. Sticks that bend..........  Pass Fail
4. Legs that bend............ Pass Fail
Mass 5. Clay ball and pancake.....  Pass Fail
6. Child crouched vs.
arms & legs spread........  Pass Fail
7. Hand in fist vs.
outstretched palm.........  Pass Fail
8. Child photographs......... Pass Fail
Weight 9. Clay ball & sausage.......  Pass Fail
10. Child crouched vs.
standing straight.........  Pass Fail
PICTURES
1. ______ 0 = Humans































Mask Task Entire-Body Limbs/Body External
1 0 0 1
4 i 1 0
1 o 0 0
1 a 0 0
0 a 2 0
2 i 1 0
2 2 2 1
1 1 2 1
1 1 1 0
1 0 0 0
2 f 0 0
2 J) 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0
2 2 3 1
2 t 3 2
5 0 0 0
1 6 0 1
2 2 2 1
4 b 0 0

























Sex Age Mask Task Entire-Body Limbs/Body External Pictures
M 4 2 1 1 0 0
M 4 3 1 1 1 0
M 4 4 1 1 1 3
M 4 5 1l 1 1 4
M 4 2 , p 0 1 5
M 4 2 a. 1 2 5
M 4 5 0 0 0 5
F 5 3 0 0 0 5
F 5 3 1 1 0 5
F 5 2 0 0 0 5
F 5 1 2 2 2 0
F 5 1 2 2 1 5
F 5 3 1 1 0 5
F 5 4 1 1 2 0
M 5 1 1 1 1 0
M 5 1 2 2 3 5
M 5 1 1 2 2 5
M 5 2 2 2 3 4
M 5 1 1 1 0 4
M 5 2 0 0 0 0












































Mask Task Entire-Body Limbs/Body External
2 2 3 3
1 2 3 3
5 1 1 0
2 3 5 4
1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0
1 2 4 2
2 1 1 0
5 1 1 0
3 1 1 2
1 3 5 4
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
1 3 4 3
1 2 4 4
2 0 0 2
1 0 0 2
1 2 3 3
4 2 4 3
5 1 1 3
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Conservation
£ Sex Age Mask Task Entire-Body Limbs/Body External Pictures
64 M 7 1 /J 3 5 5
65 M 7 1 il 4 4 0
66 M 7 2 jL 1 0 0
67 M 7 4 3 4 4 5
68 M 7 1 3 5 5 0
69 M 7 1 1 2 2 3
70 M 7 0 2 4 3 0
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